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1I
Geopolitical Environment Of The Asian–Pacific Region
The Geopolitical Structure
Geopolitics means the social and political relationship formed among the people or countries which live or
are located in the same region or geopolitical environment. For a country, geopolitics means the
international relationship between or among countries that are located in the same region, such as the
interrelationship of politics, economy, military, culture, religion and so on among those countries and
people.
Studying the geopolitical environment of a region or a country provides an objective basis for
analyzing the international security issues of this region or country. This can include analyzing the
geographical position, territorial size, natural conditions, being rich or short of resource endowment,
characteristics of the people, social and political situation, development levels of the economy, the base of
national power, domestic and foreign policy, international status, relative strength of countries and their
interrelationship and mutual influence.
The geopolitical environment of a region or a country changes from time to time. Given the dynamics
of the struggle for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the
geopolitical structure of this region could be conveniently divided into four areas as follows: Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Pacific. In each of these areas, spillover from the Cold War
manifested itself in a different way. Since the 1990s, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the global
bipolar geopolitical structure has disappeared, and the geopolitical structure of the Asian–Pacific region
also has changed a lot.
The Asian–Pacific region contains thirty-one countries. The basic geopolitical numerology of this
region can be summarized as “one superpower (the United States),” “two economic powers (the United
States and Japan),” “three political powers (the United States, Russia, and China),” “ four military powers
(the United States, Russia, China, and Japan),” and “five main political forces (the United States, Russia,
China, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)).” There are great differences
among the countries in the region in terms of social systems, historical traditions, ethnic communities and
religion, levels of economic development, national strength, and foreign policy, and so forth; but these
countries also have a lot of common interests. So the interrelationships among them are very complicated,
and need careful and skillful handling. From a Chinese perspective, the geopolitical structure of the
Asian–Pacific region can currently be divided into six areas as follows: Northeast Asia (including the far
east part of Russia, the northeast area of China, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan),
Southeast Asia (including Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and East Timor, etc.), South Asia (including Sri Lanka, Maldives, India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan), Central Asia (including Kazakhstan, Kirghiztan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), North Asia (including the Siberian area of Russia) and the West
Pacific (including the United States, Canada, and so forth). Among these, the strategic position of Northeast
Asia and Southeast Asia is prominent, and these two areas are eventful too. Viewed in terms of global
national strength, political role and influence in the Asia–Pacific region, at present, a hexagonal
geopolitical structure is beginning to replace the old Cold War pictures. Of course, the size of the six angles
is not equal.
The Main Political Forces and Their Activity Arena
In the geopolitical structure of the Asian–Pacific region, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan are the
principal political forces. ASEAN and India are also becoming important political forces. These six forces
form the basic geopolitical structure of the Asian–Pacific region, influencing the development of its
international affairs and regional security.
2 Security of the Asian–Pacific Region
The United States is the most important political force in the Asian–Pacific region. After the Second
World War, the United States became a trinary (political, economic, and military) superpower. Relying on
its strong military force, especially its strong navy, the United States controlled the Pacific Ocean and
looked upon it as its “inland lake.” It then seeped into the continent of Asia, pushed its “defense frontier” to
the Pacific island chain area, and deployed a lot of troops in the Asian–Pacific region. Its political,
economic and military influence extended over the whole Asian–Pacific region. In the northeast Asian area,
the United States signed a “Common Defense Agreement” with Japan and South Korea. In Southeast Asia,
the United States organized a military alliance treaty. In South Asia, the United States also had its influence
through foreign aid and later via nuclear nonproliferation policy. After the Vietnam War, the United States
became more cautious about military intervention in areas of peripheral interest. And geographical distance
allowed this luxury once the United States absorbed the lesson of the Vietnam War. Given its oncoming
decline in relative economic strength over the next half century, the United States won’t be able to
dominate Asian–Pacific affairs as it did during the Cold War. But at present, the United States is still the
strongest country in the Asian–Pacific region and continues to maintain about one hundred thousand troops
in Asia. 1 It plays a very important role in Asian–Pacific region affairs, especially in evolution of the
Korean Peninsula situation.
With its Eurasian breadth, Russia has been an important geopolitical force of the Asian–Pacific region.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union vied with the United States for domination of the Asian–Pacific
region in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the
inheritor of the Soviet Union, declined greatly in strength. Because of its bad economic situation, Russia’s
influence in the Asian–Pacific region dropped enormously. Though Russia pays great attention
diplomatically to the strategic value of the Asian–Pacific region, it is located in remote North Asia, and its
capability of controlling Asian–Pacific affairs farther south is limited. But Russia can exert great influence
on the adjacent countries in Central Asia.
China is a geopolitical force in a special hub position in the Asian–Pacific region. China is a country
with a five-thousand-year recorded history, and historically had its brilliant periods. The splendid science
and culture it created gave impetus to the progress of Asia and world civilization. The memory and legacy
of these achievements continue to strongly influence China’s view of its relations with the rest of the world.
China is also a country with both huge territory and neighboring seas.  Its area is almost equal to that
of the United States, about nine million and six hundred thousand square kilometers. According to the
accurate data measured by Chinese satellite, China’s state territory is ten million and four hundred thousand
square kilometers (including nine million and five hundred thousand square kilometers of territorial land
and nine hundred and twenty thousand square kilometers of territorial sea.
 2 Besides, according to
“Convention on the Law of the Sea,” the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf sea area within the
jurisdiction of China is about three million square kilometers. The span of China’s territory is rather big,
about five thousand and two hundred kilometers from east to west, five thousand and five hundred
kilometers from north to south. China’s land boundary is about twenty-two thousand kilometers, plus
eighteen thousand-kilometer continent coastlines.
China has great potential for economic development. The population of China amounts to nearly one
billion and three hundred million. The resources of labor force amounts to over eight hundred million. At
about 3 percent, China’s mobilization of military manpower may come up to more than thirty million, and
this is number one in the world. 3 China’s natural resources are in great variety, distributed broadly, and the
reserves are in great number. The potential value of the verified minerals of China is 12 percent of the
whole world, occupying number three in the world. 4 Reserves of one hundred and fifty-three kinds of
minerals have been verified.5 Among them, the industrial reserves of twelve minerals (coal, tungsten, tin,
rare earths, etc.) are the largest in the world. The reserves of iron, copper, zinc, molybdenum, manganese
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and others are also amongst the largest in the world. The reserve of petroleum is the sixth or seventh largest
in the world. As for agriculture, with only 7 percent of the world’s cultivated land, China supports 22
percent population of the world and is still roughly self-sufficient in net food production.
Since China carried out its policy of reform and opening to the outside twenty years ago, the Chinese
economy has made great progress. According to data from the Chinese Statistic Bureau, the Chinese yearly
national economic growth rate has been higher than 7 percent for the last 20 years.
 6 The Chinese gross
national product (GNP) reached 8,319 billion Yuan, namely, about one trillion dollars in 1999.
 7 The global
economic power of China grows steadily. Chinese import and export trade reached 360 billion dollars in
1999.
 8 Two thirds of Chinese import and export, 85 percent of its foreign trade and 90 percent of foreign
investment are concentrated on the Asian–Pacific region. And China is an important trade partner of all
countries in the Asian–Pacific region. Nine of the ten biggest foreign trade partners are Asian–Pacific
regional countries and areas. Among them, Japan occupies first place and the United States occupies
second place. Chinese economic development and trade have thus become critical to the prosperity of Asia.
The 21st century will be “Pacific Ocean Century.” But the “Pacific Ocean Century” can’t be successful
without China’s continuing development.
 9
China is located in the hub position of the Asian–Pacific region, being adjacent to Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia on the continent, and bordering on the Pacific Ocean on the
sea. This special geopolitical condition results in China having complex relationships with those countries
and areas around it. Neither Russia, Japan, India nor ASEAN has such a favorable position. So their
primary influences are geographically limited only to part of the Asian–Pacific region adjoining them.
In international security affairs, and especially in Asian–Pacific regional security affairs, China is a
country of great influence. China’s foreign relations are based on promotion of good relations globally and
a good-neighbor policy regionally. It pursues an independent foreign policy aimed at promoting global and
regional peace. As a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, China not only
bears important responsibility for but also can make important contributions to the peace, security and
stability of the Asian–Pacific region and the whole world.
Japan is a political force that can’t be ignored in the Asian–Pacific region. During the Second World
War, Japan launched a full-scale invasion into China and a Pacific area war, and it dominated East Asia and
West Pacific Ocean for a time. After the Second World War, Japan concentrated more of its effort on
becoming an economic power. At present, however, Japan is ambitiously taking becoming a political,
economic and military power as its strategic national goal. For historical reasons, the countries concerned
in this region pay careful attention to Japan; and the United States also continues to have particular
influence on Japan’s actions. In addition, Japan only occupies a corner of Northeast Asia geopolitically. So
it is difficult for Japan to play as dominant role as before outside the shadow of the United States.
Nevertheless, we shouldn’t ignore Japan’s important role in the Asian–Pacific region, especially its
important role in the politics of the Korean Peninsula.
ASEAN is a newly arisen geopolitical force, and it now occupies an important political, economic and
strategic position in the Asian–Pacific region. During the Cold War, Southeast Asia was a battlefield where
two superpowers struggled for hegemony; the centrality of its role was second only to the Northeast Asia.
In the 1960’s, in order to get rid of the control of foreign influence and strengthen political coordination
and economic cooperation, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines organized the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Later, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and Myanmar joined
one after another, and this makes ASEAN stronger and stronger. Now ASEAN has developed into a
regional political and economic group with a considerable role in defending its strategic interests,
maintaining stable development, and promoting peace and security in the Asian–Pacific region. However,
in the light of its present political, economic and military strength, ASEAN still doesn’t have capabilities
and influence of the United States, Russia, China or Japan in the Asian–Pacific region.
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India will develop gradually into a geopolitical force in the Asian–Pacific region. In the middle 1980’s,
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives organized the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the South Asian subcontinent. But there are sources of
insecurity such as territory and boundary disputes, ethnic and regional clashes, nuclear race among those
countries. As evidenced by their less than optimal interactions in the economic field, cooperation among
the South Asian countries has been developing slowly, and has not yet formed a relatively independent
geopolitical force like ASEAN. Moreover, among the South Asian countries, India holds absolute
predominance in aspects of resources, industry, science and technology, and military strength, and it plays a
dominant role in the economic ring of the India Ocean. Thus, the balance that promotes more enthusiastic
regional cooperation in ASEAN would be lacking, even if India–Pakistani rivalry ceased to limit SAARC’s
flexibility. Since India instituted a more open economic policy in the middle 1990’s, its economic
development has speeded up somewhat. India’s national development strategy is holding sway over South
Asia, seeking hegemony in the India Ocean, and ascending into the rank of great powers of the
Asian–Pacific region and the world. Though at present India’s influence is mainly limited to South Asia, in
pace with the growth of its strength it will develop into a geopolitical force of the Asian–Pacific region, and
it will gradually play more important role in Asian–Pacific regional affairs.
Central Asia is a potential geopolitical force that is still entering the stage of the Asian–Pacific region.
Through much of history, the world-famous “Silk Road” went through this bridge between Asia, the
Middle East and Europe. Now here is the middle link of the bridge of the Asian and European continents.
During the Cold War, Central Asia was the advance base for the Soviet Union to get into the India Ocean
from the continent. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there appeared five independent countries.
Now these five countries are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and are “the
Half Sky” of the CIS. Recent years, the countries of Central Asia have made some progress in
strengthening national independence, maintaining social stability and seeking ways to develop national
economies that are suitable to local conditions. In foreign affairs, they signed “peaceful partnership
agreement” with the NATO, and develop friendly relations and cooperation with Russia, China and the
Moslem countries around them. But for the time being, there are important outstanding problems including
domestic power struggle, ethnic and religious clashes in this area. They also haven’t made great progress in
economic reform, and haven’t formed a united political and economic group. But as a potential geopolitical
force, Central Asia is rising quietly.
5II
THE SECURITY STRUCTURE AFTER THE COLD WAR
Security Structure of the Asian–Pacific Region
In Europe the end of the Cold War had a grave impact on European security. In East Europe and South
Europe, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated. National and ethnic conflict
intensified. In the Balkan Peninsula, national and ethnic clashes led to massive war. In Russia, the
separatist war in Chechnya still goes on and there is no sign of a settlement in the near future. However, in
Asia the situation is quite different. The end of the Cold War brought the Asian–Pacific region
unprecedented peace and prosperity. After the Cold War, the United States changed its former policy of
countering and containing the Soviet Union. This was replaced by a policy of keeping a balance of regional
force, preventing a force vacuum and regional hegemony against the United States from emerging. Russia
reduced its armaments dramatically and withdrew most of its military force from the Far East area.
Meanwhile, China devotes itself to economic reform and development, pursues a good-neighbor foreign
policy, and keeps stable and friendly relations with surrounding countries. The interrelationship among the
powers of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan is generally stable and developing in the direction of
improvement, although there is not complete harmony among these four big nations. Relations between the
United States and Japan have improved further, and their alliance relationship remains a most important
factor in the security issues of the Asian–Pacific region. In South Asia, although the relations between India
and Pakistan continue to be strained, the countries in the area are pursuing economic reform at various
rates, giving priority to development and strengthening global national power; this promotes the stability of
South Asia. The participation of ASEAN in Asian–Pacific regional affairs as a whole plays a more and
more important and positive role in promoting peace and stability in region as time goes on.
But it is also obvious that the end of the Cold War has complicated security relations in the
Asian–Pacific region in some ways. After the end of the Cold War, the powers in the Asian–Pacific region
adjusted their Asian–Pacific strategy and security policy in order to meet with the new situation in this
region. These changes have provided an embryonic form of a security structure of the Asian–Pacific region.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union struggled for hegemony in the
Asian–Pacific region and formed a bipolar security structure in this region. The countries in this region
were involved in this bipolar structure to varying degrees. Though in the 1970’s, there existed a Greater
U.S.–China–Soviet Triangular relationship aimed at countering the Soviet Union, but in essence this
triangular relationship didn’t change the bipolar security structure of the U.S.–Soviet struggling for
hegemony. In the late 1980’s, along with the U.S.–Soviet relationship becoming relaxed, this Greater
U.S.–China–Soviet Triangular relationship faded. After the end of the Cold War, the bipolar security
structure in the Asian–Pacific region ended subsequently, and was replaced by a new security structure,
which is developing in the direction of multipolarization (see Figure 1).
U.S. Japan
China
RussiaASEAN
India
U.S.
China Japan
Asian–Pacific
Region
Figure 1 The New Security Structure.
6 Security of the Asian–Pacific Region
At present, six main forces exist ( the United States, Russia, Japan, China, ASEAN and India). These
six main forces make up the basic security structure, namely, a hexagonal structure in the Asian–Pacific
region (Figure 1). They play a basic stability role in the Asian–Pacific regional security. The growth and
decline of these six forces determines the basic tendency of the Asian–Pacific regional security structure.
Of these six forces, three forces (U.S., Japan and China) play dominant role, thus form a triangular
structure within the hexagonal structure. And this triangular structure plays decisive role in the
Asian–Pacific regional security structure. Among these three forces, the United States is the most important
factor in forming the security force structure in this region.
Why do we say that the United States, Japan and China are the dominant forces in the security force
structure of the Asian–Pacific region? Let’s observe and study the role of the United States first.
The United States is the first important actor affecting the security structure of the Asian–Pacific
region. As an Asian–Pacific regional country, the United States keeps its traditional influence in this
region. Since Alfred Mahan’s theory of “command of the sea” was accepted by the authority of the United
States in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the navy of the U.S. has developed rapidly,
and its influnce has reached into the whole Pacific Ocean and its coastal areas. On this basis, the United
States had been maintaining its influence in the Asian–Pacific region.
The United States has very important political interests in the Asian–Pacific region. As the only
political, economic and military superpower in the world, the United States is an indisputable leader of the
western world. But the national strategy of the United States is to be the head of the whole world, and
achieve world peace under its control. So the United States has a strong desire to lead the eastern world. In
order to accomplish this goal, the United States must strengthen its influence in the Asian–Pacific region by
taking part in Asian–Pacific regional affairs full-dimensionally.
Major economic interests of the United States lie in the Asian–pacific region. In pace with continuous
and stable economic development in the Asian–Pacific region, especially in the East Asian area, the current
revitalization of the U.S. economy is strongly connected to the Asian–Pacific region. According to the
statistics, the total volume of foreign trade of the U.S. with the countries of the Asian–Pacific region is
more than one and half times that with European countries.10 Japan is the biggest trade partner of the
United States. However, the volume of trade of the United States with China reached $61.5 billion in 1999.
Direct investment from the U.S. in the countries of the Asian–Pacific region is also increasing rapidly. In
addittion to being reliant upon the Asian–Pacific region, the U.S. also plays a very important role in
keeping the economies of the Asian–Pacific region prosperous and continually developing.
The United States maintains a strong military presence in the Asian–Pacific region, and this is the most
direct factor that influences the security situation. Currently, about one hundred thousand U.S. troops are
stationed in Asian area. At the same time, the Pacific Fleet of American Navy has strong maritime,
underwater, and air operational and maneuver capability, and this enables the U.S. to project its troops
stationed in Europe and the mainland of the U.S. rapidly to the spots where crisis took place in the
Asian–Pacific region, making a quick response to different crisis with different intensities, and this allows
the U.S. to play a role of fire brigade in Asian–Pacific security.
Japan is also an important actor affecting Asian–Pacific security. Japan is the second largest economic
power in the Asian–Pacific region, and also in the world. Its interdependent economic relations with the
countries in the Asian–Pacific region, especially with the U.S., are so close that it can’t tear itself from
them economically. Japan’s volume of foreign trade and investment in the Asian–Pacific region is far
larger than that of the total volume of all other countries in the world. So not only is Japan’s economic
security affected by the economic security of other countries in the Asian–Pacific region, but it also affects
other countries in this region in turn, and this is a very important factor to keep economic prosperity and
stability in this region.
The Asian–Pacific region is the main base and stage of Japan’s political activities. Japan once
dominated Asia politically. After the Second World War, Japan’s position was replaced by the United
States. But after the Cold War, Japan plays more and more active role in Asian–Pacific political affairs. On
                                                                        
10. Zhang Yunling, China–US–Japan Relations in Transition, (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1997) 292.
Security of the Asian–Pacific Region 7
one hand, Japan strengthens the Japan–U.S. allied relationship and takes joint actions in the Asian–Pacific
security affairs with the United States to strengthen its political influence; on the other hand, Japan attempts
to achieve its strategic goal of becoming a political power by taking the Asian–Pacific region as its main
political stage, playing a special role in Asian–Pacific affairs to gain support from the countries of the
Asian–pacific region so as to get a permanent seat on the Security Council of United Nations.
Japan has become a military power in the Asian–Pacific region. After the end of the Second World
War, many restrictions were imposed on Japan’s military development because Japan was a defeated
country. But in pace with its fast economic growth, Japan’s military expenditure increases year by year.
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s military expenditure has almost increased by 10 percent every year.
Now, Japan’s military expenditure has reached about $50 billion, next only to that of the United States, and
this is number two in the world.11 The size of the Japanese military force is not so big, less than 240,000 in
manpower.12 However, these troops are well-trained, well-equipped, and parts of its military technical
equipment lead the world.  Japan’s Army overtakes Britain in manpower. The number of Japanese tanks
exceeds that of the Britain or France. Japan’s battle planes surpass that of Italy and are equal to that of
Britain. Japan’s naval strength exceeds France, Germany and Italy, and is number three in the world.
 13 In
fact, Japan has become a military power in the Asian–Pacific region. Now Japan is trying to change its
Defense Agency into a Defense Ministry, and then achieve the last jump of its “triple-jump” strategic goal
(becoming a world-political-economic-military-power)—becoming a world military power. Japan’s
political evolution will have an important influence on the form and tendency of the Asian–Pacific security
structure. The countries in the Asian–Pacific region, especially the countries adjacent to Japan, pay close
attention to it.
China is the largest developing country in the Asian–Pacific region, and is a dominant actor to
maintain peace and stability in the Asian–Pacific region. China’s economic strength is growing rapidly.
Chinese GNP reached about $1,000 billion in 1999, and in pace with the acceleration of its step of reform
and opening to the outside, its economy has a larger impact on the rest of the world. China has close
economic relations with the countries in the Asian–Pacific region. Nine of China’s ten biggest trading
partners are Asian–Pacific countries or areas. China’s economic prosperity and stable development will
play an important role on the economic security and development in the Asian–Pacific region. China’s
economic development depends on the Asian–Pacific region. At the same time, the economic development
of the Asian–pacific region needs China’s active participation and contribution.
China possesses a considerable military force. General speaking, China’s economy is underdeveloped,
so its yearly military expenditure is very limited, only a little more than $10 billion, about one twenty-fifth
of that of the United States.
 14But China’s force is high in manpower, totaling about 3,000,000. Recent
years, its weapons and equipment have been improved to some degree. Chinese army has the ability to
maintain national internal stability and protect its territory from external invasion. It is necessary to point
out here that the growth of Chinese economic and military strength and its increasingly important role in
the Asian–Pacific regional and world affairs don’t mean that China has formed or will form a threat to any
country in the world. There is a theory so-called “ threat from China,” I think, it’s groundless.
In comparison with these three forces, there is no other country or group of countries that can play
such an important role in the Asian–Pacific security structure. Russia is located in remote North Asia, not
being mentioned political fallout from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Its political situation is not
stable enough; its economic situation is not so good; and internal conflict is preoccupying; so it is difficult
for Russia to turn to playing important role in Asian–Pacific affairs at the moment. ASEAN is still a
developing force; its role is mainly limited to Southeast Asia. India’s role and influence are mostly limited
to South Asia. In pace with its strategic goal of becoming more politically influential, India’s role and
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influence will spread to the whole Asian–Pacific region and even the whole world, but it will take a long
time.
The conclusion is that the United States, Japan and China play pre-eminent roles in Asian–Pacific
economic, political, and military activities. The United States plays very important role in Asian–Pacific
affairs through its strong economic and military strength; Japan exerts important role on Asian–Pacific
affairs mainly by its economic strength and its close allied relationship with the United States; and China
plays important role mainly by its economic potential and special hub geopolitical position. So these three
forces are the dominant factors in the Asian–Pacific security structure.
Main Characteristics of the Asian–Pacific Security Structure
Force Structure
The force structure of the Asian–Pacific region is extremely unbalanced as is evidenced by the following
characteristics. The security force of the region itself is unbalanced. Most of thirty-one countries of the
Asian–Pacific region are regional forces. Only few forces can exercise relatively great influence over the
security structure of the Asian–Pacific region. The other countries or nation groups exert influence mainly
on their adjacent countries or areas.
Among those countries, which can exercise relatively great influence over the Asian–Pacific security
structure, only three countries, namely, the United States, Japan and China, can play a dominant role in
Asian–Pacific security affairs. So the security force structure of the Asian–Pacific region is extremely
unbalanced.
The “Japan–U.S. security guarantee alliance” aggravates the unbalanced security force structure
greatly. The United States and Japan are the two most important security forces in the Asian–Pacific
region. These two forces take joint actions in Asian–Pacific security affairs, making an already unbalanced
Asian–Pacific security force structure completely lopsided from a balance of power perspective.
The consolidation of Japan–U.S. alliance system exerts two influences on the Asian–Pacific regional
security. One is that the originally unsymmetrical structure in the hexagonal security structure or the
triangular security structure becomes more unbalanced and makes the Asian–Pacific security force
structure difficult to be established on a base of stable multilateral frame. The other is that, because
Japan–U.S. alliance takes other countries as defense targets, developing Japan–U.S. bilateral relationship
on the base of containing these countries, this will make the two most developed countries and other
countries that are set up as defense targets be on guard each other, bringing great danger to the security of
the Asian–Pacific region. The U.S.–Japan’s plan of developing and disposing Theater Missile Defense
System together in the Northeast Asian area aggravates this situation.
 15
Instability and Hot Spots
“Hot Spots” are highly concentrated and there are many unstable factors. Generally speaking, peace is the
main trend of the Asian–Pacific security situation after the end of the Cold War. But there are many
potential “hot spots,” and these “hot spots” are highly concentrated. This is another characteristic of the
Asian–Pacific security structure. The main “hot spots” in the Asian–pacific region are concentrated on the
countries and areas around China, forming a “V”-shaped “hot spot”-pattern. The left of the “V”-shaped
“hot-spot”-pattern is a continent line in the northwest-southeast direction, running from Tajikstan in Central
Asia to Afghanistan, to Kashmir in the subcontinent of South Asia, and then to the Sino–India boundary,
the Sino–Vietnam boundary and Kampuchea. The right of the “V”-shaped “hot-spot”-pattern is a sea line in
the northeast-southwest direction, running from the Japan–Russia disputed four islands located in the north
of Japan, to the Japan–South Korea disputed islands, to the Korean Peninsula, to the Sino–Japan,
Sino–South Korea, Sino–North Korea disputed continent shelves, to Sino–Japan disputed Diaoyu Island, to
confronted Taiwan Strait, and ends in the territory-disputed South China Sea. Because these two lines are
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close to the mainland and sea areas of China and part of these “hot spots” are related to China, if some
incidents take place along this “hot-spot”-pattern, there is great possibility for China to be involved in
them. Even these “hot spots” don’t result in armed conflict or war, it is very thorny to solve these “hot
sports” by peaceful means. But if these “hot spots” are not settled, they could bring great threat to the peace
and stability of the Asian–Pacific region.
Economic Integration
The economy of main countries in the Asian–Pacific region is highly and mutually integrated. There are
some highly developed countries in the Asian–Pacific region, and there are also many underdeveloped
countries in this region. There is wide gap between the developed countries and the undeveloped countries.
But the main countries in the Asian–Pacific region are highly integrated economically. The volume of trade
and investment of these countries and areas with other Asian–Pacific countries and areas makes up more
than half of their volume of foreign trade and investment respectively.
The highly integrated economy of the main countries creates conditions for keeping a peaceful and
stable security situation in the Asian–Pacific region. In order to safeguard their economic interests in this
region, those countries, especially those economically integrated countries hope to have a secure and stable
environment in this region objectively. Moreover, economic interests of these countries overlap each other,
forming an interrelationship that they can only coexist and prosper together. So subjectively, these
economically integrated countries will weigh gains and losses, and avoid as far as possible taking extreme
actions from the interests of their own countries in handling the contradictions and disputes among
themselves. This will be beneficial to peace and stability of this region.
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III
ESTABLISHING SECURITY COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE
Principles for Establishing and Maintaining
In the course of establishing an integrated multilateral security cooperation and dialogue mechanism and
beyond that is suitable to the characteristics of the Asian–Pacific security structure, there are several
principles that should be brought out, abided by, and applied to the countries of the region. Only on the
basis of abiding by common principles can an integrated multilateral security cooperation and dialogue
mechanism operate smoothly. Those principles should include, but not be limited to the following points.
Openness
The mechanism should be open to all countries of the Asian–Pacific region. All countries of the
Asian–Pacific region can participate freely and withdraw from it without binding force. This mechanism
should enable the participants to fully exert their active and constructive role in Asian–Pacific security
affairs. It should not only provide opportunity for the big countries such as the United states, Japan, Russia,
China and India to play important role in Asian–Pacific affairs, but should also guarantee a voice of
regional organizations such as ASEAN and smaller countries. The proposal mechanism would have the
format like a free forum. All the participants would have a right to express their own positions and
viewpoints on Asian–Pacific security affairs, and have a right to hear the viewpoints of other participants.
In this way, it could promote identity of the Asian–Pacific region and cooperation in political and economic
fields.
Unanimity through Consultation
Security affairs are common affairs of all countries of the Asian–Pacific region, so they should be settled
according to the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation. No participant of this mechanism
should attempt to gain security interests by using its own strength to overwhelm the others. Discussions in
the form should be sensitive to the specific characteristics of different countries in political systems, levels
of economic development, foreign policies, military capability and geopolitical environment. The security
desires of different countries should be respected. In a spirit of mutual cooperation, mutual understanding
and dialogue and mutual respect, the goal would be to solve security issues in the Asian–Pacific region by
dialogue and cooperation, so as to achieve the goal of common security.
Equality
The rights and duties of the mechanism participants would be equal, even though they have different
responsibilities in Asian–Pacific security affaires. Larger powers should take more security responsibility
and play more important role in Asian–pacific security affairs. But this doesn’t mean that they have a right
to override other countries in dealing with security issues, or have a right to force other countries to accept
their will or to submit their security interest. Equality means mutually respecting other countries’ social
systems, economic development models, historical traditions, cultural backgrounds, religions, ideologies
and national characteristics.
Seeking Common Ground
It is obvious that security affairs are very complicated. It is normal that different countries have different,
sometimes even opposite, stands and viewpoints on the same security problem, because those countries are
located on different geopolitical position and have different degrees of concern to the same security
problem. So it is necessary to carry out a principle of seeking common ground on major issues while
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reserving differences on minor ones. Thus, all participants should respect the common wish of most
participant countries, put the disputed minor details aside, in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual
accommodation from the security interest of the whole Asian–Pacific region, so as to achieve a common
understanding to solve the security issues that are commonly concerned.
Non-hostility
The ultimate goal of establishing a security mechanism in the Asian–Pacific region is to reduce dangers of
raising crisis or conflict, creating a secure and stable international environment in this region. So here
should establish a principle of non-hostility, namely, the security mechanism doesn’t take any country or
nation group, no matter they participate the mechanism or not, as a target. If establishing a security
mechanism is to take certain country or nation group as a target, the establishment of the mechanism itself
will bring about an unstable situation.
Models of Security Cooperation and Dialogue
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
During the Cold War, the leader of the Soviet Union once brought forward a multilateral security plan in
Asia and initiated to establish an Asian collective security system. The United States thought that the
purpose of the Soviet proposal was to weaken or get rid of the influence of the United States in Asia, so
that the Soviet Union could take the opportunity to replace the position of the United States in Asia. So the
United States held a passive or even opposite attitude on the proposal. The other main Asian–Pacific
countries also showed indifference toward the proposal. Later, this plan disappeared from the scene. On
October 1990, Australian foreign minister proposed to establish a “Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Asia” according to the model of “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE).” 16 However, the model of CSCE doesn’t correspond to the Asian reality. There are great
differences between Europe and Asia. In Europe, two big military groups were locked in a face-off. In
Asia, Asian countries are in different security conditions, facing different problems. The size of Asia is
vast, and there are a lot of countries in Asia. These countries have utterly different history and cultural
tradition. In addition, an absolute majority of Asian countries were historically reduced to the status of
colony or semi-colony, suffering a long foreign aggression and oppression. So they are worried about being
controlled by large powers in any multilateral security and cooperation. Their security consideration is
mainly protecting themselves from outside aggression and intervention, maintaining their national
sovereignty and territory integrity. Viewing its actual operation, CSCE’s role in security is rather limited,
even though meetings have been regular since the CSCE was established twenty years ago.
Japan–U.S. Security Alliance
This model for an Asian–Pacific security mechanism is based on the Japan–U.S. bilateral security alliance,
giving priority to a bilateral security relationship, and taking multilateral security cooperation as a
supplement to bilateral security cooperation. The essence of this model is that the United States and Japan
want their security alliance to play a role just as NATO plays in Europe, maintaining and strengthening the
hegemonic position of the United States in the Asian–Pacific region. The key problem of this model is that
it views multilateral security as a secondary objective. In fact, this model depends mainly on the military
alliance system that was established in the Cold War to deal with so-called “unstable factors” according to
their national interests and strategic requirements. As we know, this military alliance was the product of the
Cold War on the basis of U.S.–Soviet confrontation. The alliance itself is intrinsically confrontational in
that it needs to find an antagonist in order to justify its existence. This orientation trends to instill a sense of
insecurity in the country or countries that set up as a target. In the extreme, this could even result in “a new
Cold War.” What the Asian–Pacific region in 21st century needs instead is a multilateral security
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mechanism that every Asian–Pacific country can play their role in the mechanism and can enjoy common
security.
ASEAN Regional Forum
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established under ASEAN’s auspices and effects of other
countries concerned. In a coordinated effort and understanding atmosphere, the dialogues among members
of the forum deepen gradually, and their common viewpoints become more and more. Facts prove that the
forum has played an important role in promoting mutual understanding, increasing mutual trust and
maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the whole Asian–Pacific region. The forum is
becoming a main channel of the Asian–Pacific region in multilateral dialogue and cooperation. Why ARF
is widely accepted and has achieved a lot mentioned above is that this permissive security forum is
relatively suitable to the characteristics of diversity of the Asian–Pacific region. Additionally, the ARF is
mainly operated by ASEAN, independent of the control of outside powers to a large extent. Of these three
models, the ARF is the one closest to what appears needed for a broader Asian–Pacific cooperation.
The Conditions for Establishing an
Integrated Multilateral Security Cooperation and Dialogue Mechanism
From the analysis above, we can see that the Asian–Pacific force structure is extremely unbalanced; “hot
spots” are highly concentrated and there are many unstable factors; and the main countries in the
Asian–Pacific region are highly and mutually integrated economically. When establishing a security
mechanism, we should take all these characteristics into consideration. At the same time, the establishment
of a security mechanism can’t be accomplished in one move. It should follow in order and advance step by
step. Only when the basic conditions are ripe, can a well-operated security mechanism be established
smoothly. What follows are a part of these conditions.
Economic Development and Cooperation
Economic interest is a basis of security interest, and security interest is a kind of reflection of economic
interest. So the first step towards establishing a security cooperation and dialogue mechanism is making all-
out efforts to develop economies and strengthen mutual economic relationships and integration. The
requirement for economic development should drive the Asian–Pacific countries to assume friendly foreign
policies, control and reduce armament, seek mutual economic cooperation, and seek mutual political
support, so as to create a favorable international environment for the development of each economy in the
region. Ongoing economic development in East Asia has not only accelerated economic integration of the
East Asian countries, but also has promoted the peace and stability in the Asian–Pacific region.
Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations
Another step involves carrying out extensive bilateral dialogues, consultations and taking practical steps to
promote mutual trust and understanding to relax tension, eliminate differences, buffer conflicts, and
achieve bilateral security. Especially, dialogues and consultations between the countries involved in
territorial disputes, national and religious tension and dispute over resources are very important in cooling
down “hot spots” or preventing new “hot spots” from emerging in the Asian–Pacific region. Dialogues
between North Korea and South Korea have relaxed tension in the Korean Peninsula. The talks held
between the heads of North Korea and South Korea in Pyongyang in the middle of last June have reached
some “close viewpoints” on the problem of unification of the Korean Peninsula. There appears a gleam of
light of national reconciliation and unification in the sky of the Korean Peninsula. Through the good offices
of powers and by negotiations between the parties concerned, the Kampuchea issue has finally been settled
peacefully. Recently relations between both sides of Taiwan Straits became strained because of Taiwanese
new leaders’ advocacy of Taiwan’s independence. “One China” is a fundamental and consistent principle
and position of Chinese government. The Chinese government is willing to hold talks with Taiwan’s
leaders under the frame of “one country, two systems.” And the Chinese authorities also gave out warnings
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that “Taiwan’s independence” means war. 17 But the Taiwan’s new leaders pay no attention to these
warnings. They advocated “Taiwan’s independence” before they came to power; yield to the strong
pressure of public opinion of counter–“Taiwan’s independence” from both sides of Taiwan Straits,
Taiwan’s new leaders expressed that they wouldn’t declare “Taiwan’s independence,” wouldn’t promote
holding referendum on the issue of reunification or independence, and would be willing to hold talks with
Chinese government, but haven’t taken any action with substantial meaning after they came to power. In
the party’s program that was adopted on July 16, Taiwan’s party in power continues to persist in its
position of “Taiwan’s independence.” 18 The Taiwanese leaders’ obstinate position of “Taiwan’s
independence” makes it very difficult to solve the Taiwan issue by peaceful negotiations. But if the two
parties of Taiwan Straits have sincerity, proceed from the great cause of peace and unification, get down to
negotiation and share each other’s viewpoints, the issue will be settled sooner or later. There are also
frictions in the Sino–U.S. relationship now and then. Fortunately, these frictions haven’t resulted in further
escalation so far, because both sides can get down to dialogue, so the contradictions become relaxed.
Recent actions on normal trade relations should help remove an annually recurring source of tension. Now
the United States takes a “full engagement” policy with China. Sino–U.S. bilateral security dialogues,
military contacts, and establishing mutual trust measures have improved the bilateral relationship, which
was once out of tune. Security dialogues and military contacts between China and Japan also contribute to
improve their bilateral relationship. Besides, dialogues between China and South Korea, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan also have promoted good-neighbor relations
with those countries, and will help with keeping peace and stability in the Asian–Pacific region.
Unfortunately, it is far not enough for the Asian–Pacific countries to carry out frank and well-meaning
dialogues and consultations each other. So there are still a number of “hot spots” in the Asian–Pacific
region and these “hot spots” frequently form a threat to the peace and stability of this region.
Establishing Sub-Regional Multilateral Security
Cooperation and Dialogue Mechanisms
On the basis of strengthening economic relationship and mutual integration, developing bilateral security
cooperation and dialogues, some sub-regional security mechanisms may be established gradually. In this
aspect, the ARF is a good model worth following. The ARF calls together about twenty high-level
ministers from the member countries of ASEAN, dialogue partners and other important countries in the
Asian–Pacific region to discuss the security issues of this region extensively and deeply, and has achieved a
lot. As a sub-regional multilateral security cooperation and dialogue mechanism, the ARF which is
dominated by ASEAN, comprising the United States, Japan, China and Russia, lays a foundation for
establishing a long, stable security mechanism that is suitable to the security characteristics of the
Asian–Pacific region. Its basic operational practice can be seen as an embryonic form of future security
cooperation and dialogue mechanism in the whole Asian–Pacific region.
The Northeast Asian security mechanism is a sub-regional security mechanism on which people place
the most hope. This mechanism should call the United States, Japan, China, Russia, North Korea, and
South Korea together to discuss the Northeast Asia security issues, especially the security problem of the
Korean Peninsula. The problem of the Korean Peninsula is the main “hot spot” in the Asian–Pacific region,
and is related to other security issues in this region. If this problem were solved, a resulting chain reaction
could result in a gradual settlement of most major Asian–Pacific security issues. The Korean Peninsula
problem needs patience, creativity, and persistence. In 1992, the diplomatic, defense officials and some
researchers of non-governmental research organizations from the United states, Japan, China, Russia, and
South Korea established a “Northeast Asia Cooperation and Dialogue Forum” in their personal capacity. So
far, this forum has held many conferences in those countries in turn. Now, some countries such as the
United States and Japan are giving impetus to promote it to a formal governmental cooperation and
dialogue organization. If North Korea could take part in it, with good roles of procedure, it is possible that
the forum can be promoted to a governmental security cooperation and dialogue mechanism of the
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Northeast Asian area. Once such a governmental security mechanism has been established, it will play very
important role in solving the Korean Peninsula problem.
Of many governmental, semi-governmental and non-governmental security cooperation and dialogue
mechanism, the Conference of Informal Heads of Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) deserves to
be mentioned here. Though there have been no security topics for discussion in the conference of APEC,
when these heads meet together, security issues will naturally become their popular topic. Even if there is
no security topic in formal agenda, the heads will discuss it “in the corridors” or at their leisure.
At different levels, multi-channel, non-governmental multilateral dialogues may promote
understanding and trust. Sometimes, some problems that are difficult to make progress on in an official
dialogue can be discussed more freely in non-governmental dialogues. While they have obvious limitations,
non-governmental dialogues can play some roles that an official discuss can’t and in some cases they can
be an indispensable supplementary to official dialogues.
The Council on Security and Cooperation in Asian Pacific (CSCAP) established at ASEAN and
Australia’s suggestion joins the research organizations on security issues in this region. The participants of
the council are scholars, experts on security issues, diplomatic and defense officials currently in their office
or relieved of their office, all participating the council in their personal capacity. They can exchange their
viewpoints extensively and bring forward their proposals on Asian–Pacific security issues. Therefore, it is
easier for them to link up between or among those countries concerned on security issues.
In addition, military contacts also contribute to multilateral security cooperation. The Pacific Army
Senior Officer Logistics Symposium sponsored by the United States Army, established in 1991, gathers
officers coming from more than twenty countries to discuss the issues such as joint logistics, joint operation
and training. The Pacific Armed Force Management Seminar, which was established in 1978, also provides
a forum for the senior officers from about thirty countries to discuss the issues of force management.
All these multi-channel, multi-level and multi-form bilateral or sub-regional security cooperation and
dialogue mechanisms create good conditions for establishing an integrated multilateral security cooperation
and dialogue mechanism in the Asian–Pacific region in near future.
Establishing an Integrated Multilateral Security
Cooperation and Dialogue for the Asian–Pacific Region
In pace with the establishment and highly effective operation of these bilateral and sub-regional, official
and non-official multilateral security mechanisms, it is undoubtedly logical to establish an integrated
security cooperation and dialogue mechanism in the whole Asian–Pacific region. Creating such a
mechanism isn’t as simple as just putting two or several sub-regional multilateral security mechanisms
together. It may evolve from a sub-regional multilateral security mechanism like ARF. Alternatively it may
be newly established on the basis of several sub-regional security mechanisms. It doesn’t matter what name
it is. Maybe it can be called “the Asian–Pacific Security Forum,” “the Asian–Pacific Security Cooperation
Organization” or something else, but it should at least have following functions.
Precaution Function. This function means that the mechanism should have the role of preventing potential
“hot spots” from emerging or preventing “hot spots” from escalating, or lowering the intensity of “hot
spots,” crisis, conflict or war to a minimum. In order to make the mechanism have such a role, a specialized
or standing function agency consisting of security experts is necessary. Its missions are responsible for
making a tracking study and analysis on the Asian–Pacific security situation, assessing the possibility of
raising crisis, conflict or war regularly, and bringing forward counter measure proposals.
Coordination Function. By saying coordination function means that this security mechanism must have a
function of calling the heads or ministers of the participants together to discuss security issues of this
region, and coordinating their stands, viewpoints so as to form a coordinate and unanimous force to deal
with different security problems properly. Therefore, there should be a standing organization in charge of
convening regular or irregular conference, communicating information on security issues each other, and
coordinating interrelationship of participant countries.
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Response Function. This function means that the security mechanism should have a response capability to
crisis or events to prevent the situation from becoming more serious so as not to cause more damage to
Asian–Pacific security when the precaution function of the mechanism ceases to be in force or some
unpredictable crisis or event takes place. In order to exert this function, the security mechanism should
have certain method or capability (political, diplomatic, economic, and/or military capability) to put an end
to the crisis or event that has taken place promptly and effectively.
Through the subsequent and simultaneous role of these functions, people have every reason to believe
that we can avoid “hot spots,” crisis, and conflicts coming into being, prevent crisis and conflicts from
escalating and bringing more harms to the security of the Asian–Pacific region in their embryonic stages,
keep long stability and security in the Asian–Pacific region.
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